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There	is	an	urgent	need	to	review	the	UK’s	system	of
communicable	disease	control	administration	and	its
public	health	laws
In	the	midst	of	a	lethal	pandemic,	the	government	controversially	axed	the	main	public	health	body
(Public	Health	England)	and	announced	the	creation	of	yet	another	bureaucracy,	designed	by
management	consultants	with	no	expertise	in	public	health.	History	shows	that	without	a	clear
overarching	strategy	and	laws,	these	ad	hoc	reforms	are	likely	to	further	hamper	the	UK’s	ability	to
protect	the	population,	explains	David	Rowland.
Experts	have	been	warning	for	decades	about	the	dangers	of	a	system	of	communicable	disease
control	administration	in	the	UK	which	is	confused,	irrational,	and	rests	upon	an	outdated	sets	of
laws,	none	of	which	have	been	framed	to	deliver	a	clear	set	of	policy	objectives.	In	1988,	Sir	Donald	Acheson,	the
former	Chief	Medical	Officer	described	a	system	which	was	‘positively	baffling’,	in	2003	a	House	of	Lords
Committee	asked	the	government	to	draw	a	map	of	how	the	system	worked,	but	it	was	unable	to	do	so.	Our	own
study	into	pandemic	preparedness	in	2013	identified	a	lack	of	clarity	about	‘who	does	what	and	how	the	system	is
co-ordinated’.
The	last	time	any	UK	government	published	a	strategy	document	relating	to	infectious	disease	control	was	18	years
ago	in	2002.	That	review	(Getting	Ahead	of	the	Curve)	established	the	Health	Protection	Agency,	a	public	body
charged	with	co-ordinating	a	response	to	a	range	of	health	threats.	In	2012,	the	Agency	was	scrapped	as	part	of
the	Lansley	reforms	to	the	health	service	to	be	replaced	by	Public	Health	England,	the	body	which	is	now	to	be
disbanded.
The	main	law	governing	the	control	of	disease	in	England	and	Wales	–	the	Public	Health	Act	1984	–	has	also	been
left	unreformed	by	policymakers.	Whilst	the	Act	was	updated	12	years	ago	to	incorporate	the	International	Health
Regulations,	the	basis	of	our	public	health	law	is	in	essence	little	different	to	the	Sanitary	Acts	of	the	Victorian	era.
The	legislation	grants	highly	authoritarian	powers	(to	detain	individuals,	close	businesses	etc.)	to	local	public	bodies
but	it	has	not	been	updated	to	reflect	the	now	radically	different	machinery	of	government	which	has	emerged	from
the	constitutional	revolutions	of	the	past	two	decades.	The	legacy	of	this	failure	to	modernise	the	system	in	line	with
a	coherent	strategy	is	now	being	seen	in	the	UK’s	tragically	hapless	and	uncoordinated	attempt	to	control	the	virus.
Take	for	example,	the	inability	of	local	authority	public	health	directors	to	exercise	control	over	outbreaks	in	their
local	areas.	Whilst	the	pandemic	is	often	viewed	from	a	national	or	global	perspective,	it	is	actually	made	up	of
hundreds	of	thousands	of	local	outbreaks.
The	Victorians	recognised	this	fact	about	infectious	disease	and	so	gave	powers	to	control	outbreaks	to	Medical
Officers	of	Health	based	in	local	authorities.	In	the	early	twentieth	century,	these	powerful	public	servants	sat	at	the
top	of	an	impressive	public	health	infrastructure	ranging	from	laboratories	to	health	visiting	to	sanitary	inspection
(see	Figure	1).
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However,	up	until	very	recently,	Directors	of	Public	Health	in	England	have	struggled	to	exert	the	necessary
authority	to	protect	their	local	communities.	This	in	part	stems	from	the	fact	their	disease	control	powers	under	the
Public	Health	Act	1984	have	in	most	cases	been	delegated	to	the	regional	teams	of	Public	Health	England	–	an
executive	agency	of	the	Department	of	Health	and	Social	Care	which	answers	directly	to	Ministers.	It	is	only	in	the
summer	of	2020	that	the	Coronavirus	regulations	gave	specific	legal	powers	to	Directors	of	Public	Health	to	take
action	to	close	premises,	ban	public	events,	and	close	outdoor	spaces	without	the	need	to	resort	to	a	magistrate.
Worryingly,	vital	data	about	infectious	diseases	was	not	being	sent	to	Directors	of	Public	Health,	in	contravention	of
the	law	on	notifiable	disease,	a	law	which	dates	back	to	the	19th	Century.	Instead,	the	data	appears	to	have	been
held	by	Public	Health	England,	but	not	shared	with	Directors	for	data	protection	reasons.	And	whilst	Directors	of
Public	Health	are	now	more	empowered	by	the	new	regulations,	this	hastily	put	together	legislation	(which	was
passed	without	Parliamentary	debate)	has	not	been	framed	in	such	a	way	as	to	resolve	the	tension	between
national	and	local	responsibility	for	control	of	the	virus,	as	has	been	witnessed	by	the	confusion	and	timing	over	the
new	local	lockdowns	in	Leicester	and	the	North	West	of	England.
Moreover,	the	legal	framework	cuts	locally	elected	Mayors	out	of	the	picture.	Even	though	the	Mayors	of	Greater
Manchester	and	London	have	played	central	roles	in	coordinating	and	managing	the	pandemic	response	in	the
UK’s	two	largest	conurbations,	neither	has	any	clear	powers	or	statutory	duties	relating	to	infectious	disease.
Looked	at	from	a	UK	wide	perspective,	the	unstable	devolution	settlement	compounds	the	problems	of	co-
ordination	and	blurs	the	picture	about	who	is	ultimately	in	charge.	Whilst	the	Civil	Contingencies	Act	2004	provides
Ministers	in	Westminster	with	emergency	powers	covering	the	whole	of	the	UK,	the	current	devolution	settlement
has	allowed	elected	representatives	in	Scotland,	Northern	Ireland	and	Wales	to	take	different	approaches	to
managing	the	pandemic.	Thus,	decisions	about	school	openings,	care	homes,	the	wearing	of	face	masks	and	the
relaxation	of	lockdown	have	been	approached	differently	across	the	four	nations.
However,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	current	constitutional	settlement	will	be	able	to	accommodate	a	fundamental
difference	in	policy	objectives	towards	the	pandemic.	If	the	Westminster	government’s	approach	is	to	live	with
COVID	19	–	as	appears	to	be	the	case	–	it	will	not	also	be	possible	for	the	governments	of	Scotland	and	Wales	to
also	seek	to	eradicate	the	disease,	which	is	their	stated	policy	goal.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	decisions	about
entry	into	the	UK	and	population	movement	across	the	internal	borders	of	the	UK	are	ultimately	made	by	Ministers
in	Westminster.	In	addition,	Westminster	still	holds	the	economic	levers	which	determine	the	sustainability	of
lockdown	policies	in	the	four	nations	–	most	importantly,	the	vast	economic	safety	net	which	includes	sick	pay
levels	and	the	furlough	scheme.	Any	reduction	in	these	benefits	impacts	significantly	on	local	attempts	to	prevent
potentially	infectious	people	from	working.
All	of	this	confusion	about	who	is	responsible	for	delivering	the	basic	public	health	response	has	been	made	worse
by	the	UK’s	fetish	for	outsourcing	and	privatisation.	In	England	the	government	has	handed	over	responsibility	for
contact	tracing	to	private	companies,	who	in	turn	have	sub-contracted	these	functions	to	other	companies.	There	is
currently	almost	no	transparency	about	what	these	companies	have	been	asked	to	do,	or	to	whom	they	are
answerable.
Attractive	as	it	might	be	politically,	axing	one	public	body	and	replacing	it	with	another	is	not	the	same	as
developing	and	implementing	an	effective	strategy	for	disease	control.	To	be	effective,	any	such	strategy	needs	to
set	out	clear	policy	objectives,	while	the	law	and	the	administrative	units	charged	with	exercising	these	powers	need
to	reflect	these	objectives,	with	clear	accountability	lines	set	out.	Mechanisms	for	resolving	disputes	between	the
local,	national,	and	devolved	administrations	should	also	be	put	in	place,	with	a	framework	for	balancing	the
competing	interests	of	population	health	with	individual	human	rights.	A	rational	approach	would	also	include	the
European	Union	in	recognition	of	the	fact	that	infectious	diseases	do	not	respect	borders	and	to	combat	the
confusion	over	quarantine	rules	for	holidaymakers.
To	date,	the	study	of	communicable	disease	control	administration	has	been	a	minority	pursuit.	However,	it	is
increasingly	clear	that	getting	this	aspect	of	public	administration	right,	is	key	to	the	functioning	of	almost	every
other	aspect	of	the	UK’s	social,	political	and	economic	life.
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